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“To bereave a man of life . . . or by violence to 
confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would 
be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must 
at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the 
whole nation; but confinement of the person, by 
secretly hurrying him to jail, where is his sufferings are 
unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, 
and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary 
government.”1   
 
The writ of habeas corpus2 affords people, seized by the 
government, the opportunity to seek review of the validity of their 
                                                          
  J.D. 2013, Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law; Assistant 
Public Defender, 4th Judicial District of Tennessee.  
1 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 
84 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
2 Translated from Latin as “you have the body.” 
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detention before the court.3  The writ protects individual liberties by 
ensuring against the arbitrary use of government power to detain 
individuals, by allowing prisoners to question their detention before a 
judge and by creating a check and balance on the branches of 
government.4  The writ, incorporated as a fundamental principle 
under the United States Constitution, provides that the privilege may 
only be suspended “in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [as] the public 
Safety may require it.”5  In fact, in 1868, Chief Justice Salton Chase 
identified the right to habeas corpus as the “the most important 
human right in the Constitution,” and the “best and only sufficient 
defense of personal freedom.”6  The scope of this article will be 
limited to the use of the writ and its suspension in cases of national 
security. 
Part I of this article will address the historical underpinnings 
of the writ of habeas corpus, including the writ’s incorporation into 
the United States Constitution from its British origin.  Part II of this 
article will discuss America’s development of the writ during the 
Civil War and post-Civil War eras, which resulted in the Ku Klux 
Klan Act.  Part III reviews the modern usage of the writ of habeas 
corpus, including the suspension of the writ following the attack on 
Pearl Harbor.  Part IV of this article focuses on how the protections of 
habeas corpus have further been diluted by the “War on Terror”7 and 
by the recent rulings affecting prisoners at Guantanamo Bay.  Finally, 
Part V analyzes the District of Columbia courts’ decisions under the 
standard established by the United States Supreme Court ruling in 
Boumediene v. Bush.8 
                                                          
3 Jonathan Hafetz, A Different View of the Law: Habeas Corpus During the 
Lincoln and Bush Presidencies, 12 CHAP. L. REV. 439, 439-40 (2009). 
4 Id. at 440. 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
6 Wayne A. Logan, Federal Habeas in the Information Age, 85 MINN. L. REV. 147, 
147 (2000) (quoting Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).). 
7 President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President upon Arrival to the 
South Lawn of the Whitehouse (Sept. 16, 2011), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001 
/09/20010916-2.html. President George W. Bush coined this phrase 
following the attack on Sept. 11, 2001 when he was urging patience: “This 
crusade - this war on terrorism - is going to take a while.” 
8 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at  744. 




PART I.  HABEAS CORPUS:  A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
 Originating in medieval England, the writ of habeas corpus 
did not independently provide a court with jurisdiction over an 
individual.9  Instead, the writ provided a procedural mechanism, by 
which the courts employed, to produce a person in front of the court 
who was needed to sufficiently adjudicate a dispute where the court 
already had jurisdiction over the matter.10  Thus, a court, acting sua 
sponte, could utilize the writ to exercise its judicial functions.11  One 
form of the writ evolved into a mechanism which allowed a prisoner 
to obtain a court order requiring officers to bring him in court for the 
purpose of ascertaining the cause for his detention.12  
 This form of habeas eventually developed into the habeas 
corpus ad subjiciendum,13 commonly referred to as the “Great 
Writ,”14 and its primary use enabled the courts to limit the power of 
the Crown.15  During the reign of Charles I, King Charles imprisoned 
individuals without explaining the reason for their detention.16  The 
writ established a procedural mechanism for a prisoner to petition a 
court to claim unlawful detention.17  Upon a prima facie case of 
unlawful detention, the court would issue the writ which required 
prison officials to produce the prisoner to determine if legal cause for 
detention existed.18  Sir Edward Coke, among others, argued that the 
Magna Carta insisted that the writ of habeas corpus allowed the court 
to enforce the legal limitations on royal commands, claiming that a 
                                                          
9 LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS:  HABEAS CORPUS 2 (2d ed. 2010). 
10 Id. at 2-3 (noting that the writ was historically used “to produce a person to 
be prosecuted, to give evidence, or to be tried in a court of proper 
jurisdiction[;] . . .  to produce a person charged with the process of 
execution[;] . . .  to move a cause involving a person to Westminister[; and] . . 
. to produce the body of a person in court”). 
11 Brian Farrell, From Westminster to the World: The Right to Habeas Corpus in 
International Constitutional Law, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 551, 553 (2009). 
12 Id. 
13 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 3. 
14 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habeas Corpus § 2. 
15 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 4. 
16 Id. at 4-7. 
17 Id. at 5. 
18 Id.  
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free man should not be imprisoned without good cause.19  Thereafter, 
in 1641, Parliament enacted the Star Chamber Act which explicitly 
authorized courts to demand adequate reasons for a prisoner’s 
detention even when the King had ordered imprisonment.20  This Act 
allowed a prisoner to petition the court, and if the court did not issue 
the writ, the prisoner was not precluded from filing another petition 
in an alternate court.21   
 However, abusive tactics continued, and prisoners were often 
transferred from jail to jail to avoid service on the correct jailer or sent 
overseas to evade the protection of the writ.22  In response, Parliament 
enacted the Habeas Corpus Act in 1679, which codified the petition 
process and prohibited unauthorized movement of prisoners.23  
Under the Act, Parliament retained the power to suspend the writ for 
certain types of cases, for limited geographical areas, and for defined 
periods of time.24 Although the Act only applied to situations where 
individuals were imprisoned by governmental officials, the common 
law writ continued to serve as a method to challenge judicially 
imposed custody.25  The court’s application of the common law writ 
remains uncertain; some authorities suggest that courts would, at 
times, investigate the basis for the detention while other accounts 
indicate that courts restricted its analysis to whether the court 
ordering the detention had proper jurisdiction over the matter.26  
However, history suggests that a court “declaring that a prisoner was 
detained under legal process issued by a court of proper jurisdiction 
was dispositive,” and the court refrained from review on the merits.27 
 As England expanded its territory through colonization, the 
recognition of the writ of habeas corpus spread with the geographic 
                                                          
19 Id. at 6; but see Ryan Firestone, The Boumediene Illusion: The Unsettled Role of 
Habeas Corpus Abroad in the War on Terror, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 555, 563 (2012) 
(stating that some academics suggest that the Magna Carta did not provide a 
basis for the writ). 
20 Firestone, supra note 19, at 563. 
21 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 9. 
22 Farrell, supra note 11, at 555-56. 
23 Id. at 556. 
24 YACKLE, supra note 9, at 11. 
25 Id. at 9-10. 
26 Id. at 10. 
27 Id. 




borders of the country.28  In all thirteen American colonies, the courts 
recognized the common law writ of habeas corpus prior to the 
American Revolution.29  Furthermore, five states felt that protection 
under habeas corpus was so important that they incorporated its 
protections in their constitutions.30  The Massachusetts’ constitutional 
provision served as a model for the first draft of the United States 
Constitution, guaranteeing: 
The privilege and benefit of the writ of habeas corpus 
shall be enjoyed in this commonwealth in the most 
free, easy, cheap, expeditious and ample manner; and 
shall not be suspended by the legislature, except upon 
the most urgent and pressing occasions, and for a 
limited time not exceeding twelve months.31 
 
 Although a provision recognizing habeas corpus became part 
of the final draft of the United States Constitution, its language, as 
ratified, and its placement within Article I have caused academic and 
judicial debate because the Framers did not place the provision under 
the powers of the Judiciary.32  Within Article I of the United States 
Constitution, which grants powers to Congress, the Suspension 
Clause dictates that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion 
[as] the public Safety may require it.”33  Thus, the clause grants a 
negative power to Congress, allowing it to suspend the use of the writ 
in certain situations rather than expressly providing for habeas corpus 
as a constitutional right.34   
                                                          
28 Farrell, supra note 11, at 557. 
29 Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the 
Suspension Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 
VA. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2010). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 1370 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. VI, art. VII). 
32 See Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 
607-08 (2009). 
33 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
34 Id.; INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“A 
straightforward reading of this text discloses that it does not guarantee any 
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By enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress expressly 
granted inferior federal courts the power to issue writs of habeas 
corpus.35  Since this time, Congress has only exercised its Article I, 
Section 9 power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus on four 
occasions.36  
 Although Congress has the power to suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus, the writ provides a detainee the ability to collaterally 
attack the lawfulness of his attainment, and it establishes an 
important balance between the branches of government.37  “It ensures 
that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will 
have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the ‘delicate balance of 
governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.”38  Although 
the writ clearly provides a check on the power of the president and 
the executive branch, more recent Supreme Court decisions have also 
invalidated congressional legislation, amounting to unconstitutional 
suspension of the writ because the legislation fails to act as a formal 
suspension.39 
 
                                                                                                                                         
content to (or even the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely 
provides that the writ shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be 
suspended.”). 
35 Id. at 592 (referencing the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73); see Ex 
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 94 (1807) (quoting Chief Justice Marshall, 
who declared that the Court did not have the jurisdiction to consider a 
petition for habeas corpus absent a directive from Congress, as provided in 
the Judiciary Act of 1789). 
36 Aaron L. Jackson, Habeas Corpus in the Global War on Terror: An American 
Drama, 65 A.F. L. REV. 263, 265-66 (2010) (explaining Congress has 
authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas on four occurrences:  (1) as a 
response to President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of the writ during the 
Civil war; (2) through passing the Klu Klux Klan Act at the request of 
President Grant; (3) during the 1902 rebellion in the Philippines; and (4) in 
1941 after the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor). 
37 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 742-43. 
38 Id. at 745 (quoting Hamdi, infra note 93, at 536). 
39 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771. 




PART II.  LINCOLN & THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
 Although the Constitution delegates Congress the right to 
suspend the writ, President Abraham Lincoln unilaterally authorized 
his army general to suspend the writ, if necessary, in April of 1861; his 
decision was prompted by the imminent fear that Confederate 
soldiers would capture Washington, D.C.40  Under presidential 
orders, military officials arrested and detained individuals on mere 
suspicion without providing reason for their detention.41  Since 
Congress was not in session at the time, Lincoln asserted that the 
arrest and detention of Confederate soldiers were necessary to protect 
and preserve the Nation.42  Criticism erupted and Lincoln responded 
at a special session of Congress convened by Lincoln, stating: 
It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and 
that the public safety does require the qualified 
suspension of the privilege of the writ which was 
authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that 
Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this 
power. But the Constitution itself, is silent as to which, 
or who, is to exercise the power; and as the provision 
was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot 
be believed the framers of the instrument intended, 
that in every case, the danger should run its course, 
until Congress could be called together; the very 
assembling of which might be prevented, as was 
intended in this case, by the rebellion.43 
 
Although Congress did not specifically concede that the Executive 
Branch had the power to suspend the writ under the United States 
Constitution, Congress ratified the President’s actions after two years 
of debate by enacting the Habeas Corpus Act in 1863, which allowed 
                                                          
40 E.g., Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444.  
41 Tyler, supra note 32, at 638. 
42 See Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444-45.  
43 Frank J. Williams, Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties-Then and Now: Old 
Wine in New Bottles, 3 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 533, 540 (2010). 
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the President to suspend habeas corpus for a limited amount of time 
when public safety required.44 
 Shortly after the enactment of the Habeas Corpus Act, the 
Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Milligan,45 described the functioning of the 
Suspension Clause. The Court explained that the privilege of the writ 
existed separately from the writ itself, noting that “[t]he suspension of 
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not suspend the writ 
itself.  Instead, the writ issues as a matter of course, and on the return 
made to it, the court decides whether the party applying is denied the 
right of proceeding any further with it.”46  Thus, a court was still able 
to issue the writ, and, upon review, the court had the ability to 
ascertain whether individual petitioning the writ was part of the class 
of the individuals for which the writ was suspended.47 
KU KLUX KLAN 
 For the second time in the nation’s history, Congress 
authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus shortly 
after the conclusion of the Civil War as the Ku Klux Klan engaged in 
domestic terrorist activities.48  The Ku Klux Klan committed violent 
murders, attacks, and rapes, reaching epic proportions, yet resulting 
in few prosecutions from local authorities.49 In fact, the Klan’s 
prevalence within communities threatened the very existence of local 
government, controlling law enforcement and terrorizing any 
individual willing to testify in court against its members.50  In the 
wake of this emergency, Congress supported President Grant’s 
insistence to institute military law, allowing the detention of 
suspected Ku Klux Klan members in an effort to destroy the secrecy 
among its members and prevent witness intimidation by enacting the 
Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871.51  Furthermore, the Act allowed the 
President to suspend the writ for the purposes of defeating the 
                                                          
44 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 445.  
45 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
46 Id. at 130-32. 
47 See id. 
48 Tyler, supra note 32, at 656. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 656-57. 




rebellion and to preserve public safety through preventative 
detention.52 
 The Act, however, expressly limited the power of the 
Executive Branch.53  Prior to suspending the writ in any given area, 
the President was required to order the insurgents to disperse.54  In 
addition, the President only had the authority to suspend the writ 
until Congress’s next legislation session.55 The Act also required the 
release of a prisoner if he or she was not indicted by the next seated 
grand jury.56  This legislation, however, spurred extensive debate.57 
 Opponents of suspension asserted that Congress vested the 
President with broad discretion to impact individual liberties.58  In 
contrast, supporters suggested that suspension of the writ was 
essential to restoring order in the affected communities, thereby 
ensuring its citizens political and civil rights.59  A consensus emerged, 
with both sides purporting that the suspension of the writ was an 
extraordinary measure.60  Retrospectively, however, Congress, 
concluded that this preventive suspension of the writ was necessary, 
finding “[t]he results of suspending the writ of habeas corpus . . . 
show that where the membership, mysteries, and power of the 
organization have been kept concealed this is the most and perhaps 
only effective remedy for its suppression.”61 
 A Mississippi newspaper reporter, William McCardle, filed an 
appeal to the Supreme Court after being arrested for the content of his 
articles and tried before a military tribunal.62  Following oral 
arguments, Congress repealed section 3 of the Habeas Corpus Act of 
1867, which effectively stripped the Supreme Court from jurisdiction 
to review the final judgments of habeas corpus petitions heard in 
                                                          
52 Id. 




57 Id. at 658. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 658-59. 
60 Id. at 659. 
61 Id. at 661-62 (quoting S. Rep. No. 42-41, pt. 1, at 99 (1872)). 
62 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 508 (1868). 
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lower courts based upon Congress’s power under the Constitution’s 
Exceptions Clause.63  The Supreme Court acknowledged that 
Congress had acted within the scope of its power and dismissed the 
case for want of jurisdiction.64 
 In contrast, in Ex Parte Yerger,65 the Supreme Court held that it 
had jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus to an individual 
asserting his unlawful imprisonment.66  The Court effectively 
distinguished this case from Ex Parte Milligan by ruling that the repeal 
applied only to writs brought before the Court under the Habeas 
Corpus Act.67  Yet, unlike Milligan, Yerger had petitioned the Court 
for a common law writ of habeas corpus.68  Thus, it seems that the 
Supreme Court recognized that Congress could strip its jurisdiction 
for specific categories of cases; however, Congress’s use of the 
Exceptions Clause did not result in a broad interpretation of 
Congress’s actions, but would be limited in scope. 69 
PART III.  USAGES OF THE WRIT IN THE 20TH CENTURY 
WORLD WAR II 
 As global advances were made in modern warfare, the 
Hawaiian Government recognized a real and imminent threat of war 
in the Pacific.70 In response Hawaii’s legislature enacted the Hawaii 
Defense Act71 on October 3, 1941, which delegated broad powers to 
                                                          
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 510-11. 
65 Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868). 
66 Id. at 88. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 511-12 (“The act conferring the 
jurisdiction having been repealed, the jurisdiction ceased; and the court had 
thereafter no authority to pronounce any opinion or render any judgment in 
this cause. No court can do any act in any case, without jurisdiction of the 
subject-matter. It can make no difference at what point, in the progress of a 
cause, the jurisdiction ceases. After it has ceased, no judicial act can be 
performed.”). 
70 J. Garner Anthony, Hawaiian Martial Law in the Supreme Court, 57 YALE L.J. 
27, 28 (1947). 
71 1941 Haw. Sess. Laws 1-25.  




the executive branch in case of emergency, granting the governor 
power over citizens and property, while only providing minimal 
safeguards to individual rights.72  After the devastating attack on 
Pearl Harbor on occurring December 7, 1941, Governor Joseph 
Poindexter responded by invoking the power granted under the 
Hawaii Defense Act, proclaiming martial law, establishing himself as 
the military governor of Hawaii, publishing ordinances aimed at 
governing the conduct of the Territory’s citizens, and creating 
military tribunals to punish ordinance offenders.73  Moreover, the 
governor suspended the privilege writ of habeas corpus by relying on 
the Hawaiian Organic Act74 which dictated: 
The governor shall be responsible for the faithful 
execution of the laws of the United States and the 
Territory of Hawaii . . . and he may, in case of rebellion 
or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the 
public safety requires it, suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus or place the Territory, or any part thereof, 
under martial law until communication can be had 
with the president and his decision thereon made 
known.75 
The governor complied with the Hawaiian Organic Act by notifying 
President Roosevelt that he had suspended the privilege of the writ, 
but failed to communicate the extent of the power he had assumed.76  
Without the benefit of this critical detail, the President supported the 
Hawaiian governor’s actions.77  Therefore, based upon the President’s 
uninformed approval, the Hawaiian military overtook courtrooms 
and issued orders without regard to territorial, federal, or 
constitutional protections, including censorship of the press.78  The 
military rule created extreme oppression over the rights of the 
Hawaiian citizens as later noted by the Supreme Court: 
                                                          
72 Antony, supra note 70, at 28-29. 
73 Id. at 29. 
74 48 U.S.C. § 532 (1940). 
75 Antony, supra note 70, at 29. 
76 Id. at 30. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 31. 
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[T]he military authorities took over the government of 
Hawaii. They could and did, by simply promulgating 
orders, govern the day to day activities of civilians who 
lived, worked, or were merely passing through there. 
The military tribunals interpreted the very orders 
promulgated by the military authorities and proceeded 
to punish violators.79 
PART IV:  USAGES OF THE WRIT IN THE 21ST CENTURY  
“THE WAR ON TERROR”  
The devastating events of September 11, 2001, ignited fear and 
insecurity in the hearts of Americans.  During President George W. 
Bush’s address to the nation following the attacks he stated, “All of 
this was brought upon us in a single day, and night fell on a different 
world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”80  A new sense 
of nationalism immediately emerged as citizens united to honor the 
victims.81  In addition, this event provoked the United States to 
develop new security initiatives for the protection of its citizens and 
to enact legislation aimed at prosecuting individuals involved in 
terrorist activity and preventing further attacks on American soil, 
including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
(“USA PATRIOT Act”)82 and the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (“AUMF”), which allowed the President to “use all necessary 
and appropriate force” against those aiding terrorists.83  The United 
States military led invasions, killing and detaining individuals 
allegedly involved with the al Qaeda organization.84  As a result, 
                                                          
79 Id. (quoting Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309 (1946)). 
80 President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Sept. 20, 
2011), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/ 
releases/2001/ 09/20010920-8.html.  
81 COLLEEN E. HARDY, THE DETENTION OF UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANTS 
DURING THE WAR ON TERROR, 5 (2009). 
82 Id. at 2-3. 
83 Tor Ekeland, Suspending Habeas Corpus: Article i, Section 9, Clause 2, of the 
United States Constitution and the War on Terror, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1475, 
1503 (2005) (quoting Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). 
84 Id. 




numerous detainees around the globe petitioned federal courts, 
claiming illegal detention and illegal suspension of the writ.85   
As United States military forces captured enemy combatants 
abroad, the Bush Administration deliberately selected Guantanamo as 
the location to imprison its detainees.86  Guantanamo is a territory 
currently leased and entirely controlled by the United States; 
however, it falls under the Republic of Cuba’s ultimate sovereignty.87  
Therefore, the Bush Administration determined that the prisoners 
held there would not be entitled to the Constitution’s protections, 
including the writ of habeas corpus.88  Thus, the United States could 
theoretically hold the detainees indefinitely without violating the 
Constitutional mandate of formal suspension of the writ89 due to the 
United States Supreme Court holding in Johnson v. Eisentrager, which 
denied habeas rights to a prisoner who:   
(a) [wa]s an enemy alien; (b) ha[d] never been or 
resided in the United States; (c) was captured outside 
of our territory and there held in military custody as a 
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a 
Military Commission sitting outside the United States; 
(e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside 
the United States; (f) and is at all times imprisoned 
outside the United States.90 
 
Thus, the ruling allowed government officials to manipulate a 
prisoner’s location to purposefully evade the protection of the writ--- 
the very evil that the writ was intended to guard against.91    
As the “War on Terror” escalated, petitions for the writ of 
habeas corpus flooded the courts, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to several “War on Terror” detainees.  In these opinions, the 
Court clarified the constitutional protection of the writ and 
                                                          
85 Id. 
86 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 441.  
87 HARDY, supra note 81, at 152.   
88 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 441. 
89 Id. at 442. 
90 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950). 
91 Hafetz, supra note 3, at 444. 
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established jurisdictional requirements when “enemy combatants” 
asserted that they possessed a right to petition the court for habeas 
corpus.  On June 28, 2004, the United States Supreme Court decided 
three such opinions:  Rumsfeld v. Padilla,92 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,93 and 
Rasul v. Bush.94 
In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, federal agents apprehended Padilla, a 
United States citizen, while disembarking a plane at Chicago O’Hare 
International Airport.95  Ultimately, the Department of Defense 
detained Padilla at the Consolidated Navy Brig in Charleston, South 
Carolina and designated Padilla as an “enemy combatant.”96  Padilla 
filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 
Southern District of New York97 where he had been in criminal 
custody prior to his detention in South Carolina.98 Although not 
reviewing the merits of Padilla’s petition, the United States Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to determine the proper respondent for the 
petition and whether the Southern District of New York had 
jurisdiction over this respondent.99  The Court held that “the proper 
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being 
held, not the Attorney General or some other remote supervisory 
official.”100  Since Commander Marr was the equivalent of a warden at 
the naval brig, the Court determined that Marr, instead of Secretary 
Rumsfeld was the proper respondent.101  Furthermore, the Court 
found that “the general rule for core habeas petitions challenging 
present physical confinement, jurisdiction lies in only one district---
the district of confinement.”102  Thus, the South Carolina District 
Court was the only court with jurisdiction over the petition.103  The 
                                                          
92 Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
93 Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
94 Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
95 Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430. 
96 Id. at 431-32. 
97 Id. at 432. 
98 Id. at 430-31. 
99 Id. at 434. 
100 Id. at 435. 
101 Id. at 436.  
102 Id. at 443. 
103 Id. at 451. 




Court remanded the case with an order of dismissal without 
prejudice.104   
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Northern Alliance seized a United 
States citizen living in Afghanistan and turned him over to the United 
States military.105  Interrogated and detained in Afghanistan, Hamdi 
was later transferred to Guantanamo and, eventually, to the naval 
brig located Charleston, South Carolina.106  The Government labeled 
Hamdi as an “enemy combatant” and claimed that this status alone 
justified indefinite detention without formal charges or 
proceedings.107  Although the Court noted that formal suspension of 
the writ had not occurred,108 it recognized that Congress had enacted 
the AUMF after 9/11, which “authorize[d] the President to use ‘all 
necessary and appropriate force’ against ‘nations, organizations, or 
persons’ associated with the . . . terrorist attacks.”109  In holding that 
Hamdi must be notified of the factual basis for his classification as an 
“enemy combatant”110 and allowed to dispute his status before a 
neutral decision-maker in a timely and meaningful manner, the Court 
stated that the proceeding “may be tailored to alleviate [its] 
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing 
military conflict.”111  The Court suggested that the hearing could 
include the introduction of hearsay and a burden-shifting scheme that 
would allow the Government a rebuttable presumption as to the 
credibility of its evidence, requiring the petitioner to rebut the 
presumption with more “persuasive evidence.”112  Moreover, the 
Court stated that those deemed to be “enemy combatants” could be 
detained throughout the duration of the hostilities with the Taliban, 
which could potentially result in indefinite confinement.113  Therefore, 
the Court ruled that the government’s standard of “some evidence” 
                                                          
104 Id. 
105 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
106 Id. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 525. 
109 Id. at 518. 
110 The Court defined “enemy combatant” as individual who was “‘part of or 
supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ . . . and 
[who] ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.’” Id. at 516. 
111 Id. at 533. 
112 Id. at 533-34. 
113 Id. at 520. 
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was inadequate under the Constitution’s due process standard.114  The 
Court noted that its holding did not preclude the government from 
utilizing a military tribunal employing a constitutional process.115 
  In Rasul v. Bush, the United States Supreme Court considered 
whether the protections of habeas corpus should be extended for two 
Australian citizens and twelve Kuwaiti citizens who were captured 
abroad during military actions against al Qaeda and the Taliban.116  
Filing in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
the petitioners challenged their detention, claiming that they were not 
“enemy combatants” or terrorists and alleging that they were not 
allowed access to a court or tribunal.117  The district court dismissed 
all actions for lack of jurisdiction by relying on Johnson v. Eisentrager 
and found that the privilege of the writ did not extend to a territory in 
which the United States lacked sovereignty.118  The Court recognized 
that the rule in Eisentrager only applied to detainees’ constitutional 
right to habeas corpus review.119  Thereafter, the Court analyzed 
whether the habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which authorized federal 
district courts to hear petitions of the writ for any person “in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States,” and “within their respective jurisdictions,”120 provided 
judicial review to the Guantanamo detainees where the United States 
did not have ultimate sovereignty.121  After reviewing the lease with 
Cuba which stated that the United States has “complete jurisdiction 
and control” over Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, the Court determined 
that the statute would provide the district court with jurisdiction over 
claims of a United States citizen and, since the statute did not state 
that aliens and citizens would be treated differently, ruled that aliens 
were entitled to protection of the writ under the statute.122  Thus, the 
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Court remanded the case to the district court for a decision on its 
merits.123 
In 2006, the Supreme Court, granted certiorari to Hamdan, an 
alien detainee, imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay.124  Shortly after 9/11, 
a presidential order was issued, governing “Detention, Treatment, 
and Trial of Certain Non Citizens in the War Against Terrorism” 
when the “President determines ‘there is reason to believe’ that he or 
she (1) ‘is or was’ a member of al Qaeda or (2) has engaged or 
participated in terrorist activities aimed at or harmful to the United 
States.”125  The Government moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction 
based upon the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, (“DTA”), which 
removed jurisdiction from any court to consider “an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.”126  Instead, the 
Act vested the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) exclusive 
jurisdiction to establish the classification of the detainees located in 
Guantanamo and vested the District of Columbia exclusive 
jurisdiction for final review, albeit with a limited scope, of the CSRT’s 
determination.127  The Court denied the Government’s motion, 
finding that the jurisdiction stripping statute did not affect pending 
cases.128 
Turning to the merits of the case, the Court addressed whether 
Hamdan’s charge of a conspiracy could be tried by a military 
commission under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) 
and the Geneva Conventions.129  The Court recognized that, 
historically, military commissions have been convened as “an 
‘incident to the conduct of war’ when there is a need ‘to seize and 
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt 
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127 Id. at 570, 573. 
128 Id. at 577. 
129 Id. at 567. 
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to thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of 
war.’”130  However, the Court determined that the offense of 
conspiracy did not constitute an offense against the law of war 
because neither the acts in furtherance of the conspiracy would not be 
considered a war crime nor did they occur during a time of war.131 
Furthermore, the procedures employed by the military commission 
did not pass constitutional muster and violated both the UCMJ and 
the Geneva Conventions.132  “Another striking feature of the rules 
governing Hamdan's commission is that they permit the admission of 
any evidence that, in the opinion of the presiding officer, ‘would have 
probative value to a reasonable person,’” including hearsay and 
evidence obtained through coercion.133  In addition, any appeal panel 
was required to “disregard any variance” from governing 
procedures.134  The Court concluded that the tribunal must provide 
the protections guaranteed by courts-martial.135  In direct response to 
this holding, Congress responded by enacting the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), 10 U.S.C. § 948 et seq. (Supp. 2007), 
which denied federal courts jurisdiction of habeas corpus actions 
pending at the time of enactment.136 
In Boumediene, a petition for habeas corpus was granted 
certiorari, and the Court recognized that the statute had stripped the 
Court of jurisdiction over the case.  However, the Court addressed 
whether the constitutional privilege of the writ extended to enemy 
combatant detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.137  The Court analyzed 
the historical basis for the writ of habeas corpus, noting that during 
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132 Id. at 567. 
133 Id. at 614 (quoting Department of Defense, Military Commission Order 
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federal Constitution ratifying conventions, the Suspension Clause was 
“an ‘exception’ to the ‘power given to Congress to regulate courts,’” 
and the “Clause not only protects against suspensions of the writ but 
also guarantees an affirmative right to judicial inquiry into the causes 
of detention.”138  In addition, the Court rejected the argument that the 
protection of the writ only applied in territories where the United 
States maintained de facto sovereignty and held that the Suspension 
Clause had full effect in Guantanamo Bay.139  Thus, the Court held 
that the Constitutional privilege of the writ applied to the 
Guantanamo detainees, which could not be withdrawn without a 
formal suspension.140 
Thus, the Court analyzed whether Congress could avoid 
formally suspending the writ by statutorily creating a mechanism that 
provided an adequate substitute for the writ’s protection.141 By enacting 
the DTA, Congress provided a review of the CSRT’s proceedings 
limited to assessing whether the CSRT complied with its own 
procedures.142  However, the Court found that a substitute habeas 
proceeding: 
must have the means to correct errors that occurred 
during the CSRT proceedings . . . includ[ing] some 
authority to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s 
evidence against the detainee.  It also must have the 
authority to admit and consider relevant exculpatory 
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139 Id. at 770-71 (distinguishing the facts from Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), 
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141 Id. at 733 (“After Hamdi, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether 
individuals detained at Guantanamo were ‘enemy combatants,’ as the 
Department defines that term.”). 
142 Id. at 777. 
174                                                          1 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2014) 
 
 
evidence that was not introduced during the earlier 
proceeding.143 
 
Furthermore, a habeas substitute court must be able to order 
conditional release.144  Although the Court recognized that the 
legitimacy of the military objective in detaining threats to our nation 
in order to avoid the dispersion of classified information, the Court 
held that the DTA impermissibly diluted the protection of the writ.145 
 
This opinion ensures that the historical protection of the writ 
of habeas corpus applies to the detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  
However, the Supreme Court has not granted certiorari to any habeas 
corpus petitions since the Boumediene decision.  Moreover, a study 
from the Seton Hall Law School suggests that the writ has not been 
given the Constitutional protections as allocated by the Supreme 
Court’s holdings.146  In fact, the report notes that since Boudmediene’s 
decision, forty-six habeas petitions have been filed, but after the 
District of Columbia Circuit Court decided Al-Adahi v. Obama147 in 
2010, detainees have lost 92% of petitions as a result of judicial 
deference to the Government’s allegations.148 
In Al-Adahi, the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia granted Al-Adahi’s petition for writ of habeas corpus 
because the court found “‘no reliable evidence in the record that [Al-
Adahi] was a member of al-Qaida’ and ruled that he should be 
released.”149  The Government appealed, and the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court first acknowledged that both parties agreed that the 
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preponderance of the evidence standard should be applied.150  
However, the court admonished the district court in failing to apply 
the “conditional probability analysis,” finding: 
Those who do not take into account conditional 
probability are prone to making mistakes in judging 
evidence.  They may think that if a particular fact does 
not itself prove the ultimate proposition (e.g., whether 
the detainee was part of al-Qaida), the fact may be 
tossed aside and the next fact may be evaluated as if 
the first did not exist.  This is precisely how the district 
court proceeded in this case:  Al Adahi’s ties to bin 
Laden “cannot prove” he was part of Al Qaida and this 
evidence therefore “must not distract the Court.”  The 
fact that Al Adahi stayed in an al-Qaida guesthouse “is 
not in itself sufficient to justify detention.  Al Adahi’s 
attendance at an al-Qaida training camp “is not 
sufficient to carry the Government’s burden of 
showing that he was part” of al-Qaida.  And so on.  
The government is right:  the district court wrongly 
“required each piece of the government’s evidence to 
bear weigh without regard to all (or indeed any) other 
evidence in the case.  This was a fundamental mistake 
that infected the court’s entire analysis.151 
 
The court proceeded to discuss evidence in the record, which 
independently may be insufficient to categorize Al-Adahi as an 
enemy combatant, but when analyzed as a whole met the 
                                                          
150The court, however, was unconvinced that the Constitution requires a 
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preponderance of the evidence standard.152  Therefore, the court 
remanded the case with instructions to deny Al-Adahi’s petition.153 
 Since the Al-Adahi decision, only one petition has been 
granted, Latif v. Obama,154 but it was subsequently vacated and 
remanded.  Further, the Seton Hall Law School’s study suggests that 
the individual components of evidence that the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court utilized to justify its reversal in Al-Adahi: hostile acts, 
detainees staying in guesthouses, detainees attendance at a training 
camp, and a detainees’ travel route, have been employed by the 
district court to systemically deny later habeas court petitions, 
suggesting that governmental findings are afforded extreme 
deference.155 
 In Latif, the district court granted Latif’s petition for habeas 
corpus, and, once again, the government appealed.156  Although Latif 
did not deny that he had been interviewed and did not claim that his 
statements were involuntary, he argued that the governmental record 
was unreliable because “his interrogators [Text Redacted By the 
Court] so garbled his words that their summary bears no relation to 
what he actually said.”157  The district court determined that there was 
a serious question as to the accuracy of the government’s reports.158  
However, the circuit court rejected this finding.159 
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 The circuit court noted that there is a presumption of 
authenticity and regularity of governmental reports.160  The 
presumption of regularity “presumes the government official 
accurately identified the source and accurately summarized his 
statement, but it implies nothing about the truth of the underlying 
non-government source’s statement.”161  The court concluded that the 
district court was required to make specific findings as to Latif’s 
credibility, but rather it had determined that Latif presented a 
“plausible alternative story.”162  Therefore, in absence of such a 
credibility finding, the court vacated the order and remanded the 
case.163   
PART V:  CONCLUSION 
 Although the Court determined that the enactment of the DTA 
constituted an impermissible suspension of the writ because of a lack 
of formal suspension in Boumediene, the Court never stated whether 
Congress could formally suspend the writ based on the “War on 
Terror.”164  Under the Constitution, the writ may only be suspended 
“in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion [as] the public Safety may require 
it.”165  Historically, Congress has only utilized its power to suspend 
the writ when hostilities occurred on U.S. soil, affecting a limited 
number of defined individuals or for a limited duration.    
 Our enemies in the “War on Terror” include individuals 
affiliated with the underground terrorist organization al Qaeda.  Its 
membership spans across many countries, and its decentralized 
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system makes it difficult to ascertain its members.  In comparing this 
organization to the historical enemies where the writ was suspended, 
this organization most closely resembles the Klu Klux Klan because 
the Klan’s membership did not encompass an entire region or nation.  
However, during this period, Congress delicately balanced the 
nation’s need to usurp the power of the Klan to preserve the 
legitimacy of the justice system against the fundamental principle that 
the executive branch should not be able to yield the power to 
arbitrarily imprison individuals by expressly limiting the executive 
branch’s power during the writ’s suspension.  Congress seemingly 
recognized that, during periods of rebellion, the executive branch 
may abuse its power and undermine the constitutional protection of 
the writ. 
Even in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in 
England during the 1600s: 
[T]he writ proved to be an imperfect check.  Even 
when the importance of the writ was well understood 
in England, habeas relief often was denied by the 
courts or suspended by Parliament.  Denial or 
suspension occurred in times of political unrest, to the 
anguish of the imprisoned and the outrage of those in 
sympathy with them.166 
  
Furthermore, the Court understood that habeas corpus proceedings 
are more crucial where detention is ordered by the executive branch 
rather than a disinterested tribunal.167   
 
In addition, under the Ku Klux Klan Act, Congress restricted 
the executive branch’s power by limiting the suspension’s duration.  
The “War on Terror,” however, is perpetual, and contains no 
identifiable means to determine its conclusion.  In fact, the Boumediene 
Court acknowledged that the “War on Terror” was clearly 
distinguishable from prior military conflicts which were for limited 
duration, and that the Court may need to address the outer limits of 
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the president’s war powers “to preserve constitutional values while 
protecting the Nation from terrorism.”168  Thus, it is unclear whether 
Congress could currently constitutionally suspend the writ after more 
than ten years after al Qaeda’s invasion based on the constitutional 
requirement that the writ may only be suspended for the public 
safety.   
 
Moreover, without a formal suspension, the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay are entitled, under the Boumediene decision, to the 
constitutional protections of the writ.  The Court declared, “[w]ithin 
the Constitution’s separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of 
judicial power are as legitimate or as necessary as the responsibility to 
hear challenges to the authority of the Executive to imprison a 
person.”169  However, the District of Columbia Circuit Court has 
impermissibly ignored this critical responsibility, and its decisions 
threaten individuals misclassified as enemy combatants with 
indefinite confinement and without effective means to challenge their 
detention. 
 
A CSRT consists of a hearing and a review of classified and 
unclassified evidence by a panel of three military judges, and 
evidence against the detainee is withheld from him, making it 
seemingly impossible to rebut his involvement in al Qaeda or other 
terrorist organizations.  Furthermore, the detainees do not have access 
to sources of proof due to both their imprisonment and distance from 
their homeland.170 Finally, the rules of evidence and criminal 
procedure have been relaxed to such an extent that the ownership of 
personal property similar to property employed in al Qaeda 
                                                          
168 Id. at 797-98. 
169 Id. at 797. 
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bombings can be introduced as evidence of the detainee’s affiliation to 
the organization, even without an admission of ownership by the 
detainee or a chain of custody establishing ownership. 
 
In Boumediene, the Court recognized that the “necessary scope 
of habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier 
proceedings,” and, when detention is based upon an executive order 
rather than a judicial proceeding in front of a disinterested judge, the 
habeas court must have authority to conduct meaningful review, of 
both cause for detention and the Executive’s power to detain.171  
However, the court continually fails to exercise its authority.  The 
District of Columbia Circuit Court has unilaterally instituted a 
standard of review that is insurmountable for these detainees.  
Deference is afforded to the Government’s findings of fact and 
documents, whereby the detainee must prove his innocence without 
adequate means of doing so after only a probable cause hearing 
which has determined his status as an enemy combatant, even in a 
time when the needs of war do not mandate such a relaxed standard.  
This diminishes the underlying purpose of the writ and its collateral 
function, which provides the habeas court the power to review the 
sufficiency of the Government’s evidence used to detain the 
individual.  The Judiciary must necessarily act as a check on the 
Executive branch’s power, but blanket deference to the Government 
results in no check at all – when it is the only check that can reverse an 
arbitrary and indefinite detention. 
 
The problem is further exacerbated because the CSRT and 
habeas reviews cannot be fully scrutinized by our nation’s citizens.  
American courts have historically existed as open forums, ensuring 
the integrity of the justice system.  In Globe Newspaper Company v. 
Superior Court for Norfolk County,172 the United States Supreme Court 
noted:  
 
the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly 
significant role in the functioning of the judicial 
process and the government as a whole.  Public 
scrutiny of a criminal trial enhances the quality and 
safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process, with 
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benefits to both the defendant and to society as a 
whole.  Moreover, public access to the criminal trial 
fosters an appearance of fairness, thereby heightening 
public respect for the judicial process.  And in the 
broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits 
the public to participate in and serve as a check upon 
the judicial process - - an essential component in our 
structure of self-government.  In sum, the institutional 
value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both 
logic and experience. 
Although the Court has historically recognized exceptions to open 
courtroom proceedings where safety and justice demands, these 
closed proceedings are memorialized in court records and documents 
available to the public at a later time.  In the CSRTs and habeas 
reviews, concerns for national safety require that they be closed to the 
public.  However, many of the documents available to the public for 
review are redacted or deemed classified information, preventing any 
real scrutiny by the public.   
 
 Therefore, as the law stands now, the Guantanamo Bay 
detainees are destined to indefinite detention without any meaningful 
review.  Congress is arguably unable to formally suspend the writ, 
which could limit the power of the Executive in detaining those 
classified as enemy combatants.  Furthermore, our nation’s citizens 
have no meaningful method to ascertain whether the judicial system 
is adhering to Constitutional mandates.  Meanwhile, the District of 
Columbia of Circuit Court has given the Executive Branch extreme 
deference in its findings, eliminating all cognizable rights to the writ 
under our Constitution.  
